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RESPONSES
Gerhard Casper*
While I generally agree with Professor Henkin's analysis of the
allocation of the foreign affairs power, I should like to provide a
somewhat different emphasis, voice a disagreement, and finally
address myself to a practical suggestion for creating a more effective
foreign policy system.
In his statement to the Commission, as in his excellent book,
Foreign Affairs and the Constitution,' Professor Henkin demon-
strates that the great abstraction of separation of powers is only
valuable as a starting point in describing the respective roles of
Congress and the President in formulating and implementing for-
eign policy. Many questions remain unanswered. Some have
argued, for example, that the President is the "sole organ" of the
federal government for foreign affairs. 2 This notion, however, is a
fantasy: the actual constitutional arrangement is one of shared res-
ponsibilities. While the President does conduct our daily foreign
relations, the Congress' war, 3 spending,4 and foreign commerce'
powers assure it a continuing involvement in foreign policy formula-
tion and implementation as well.
On these points Professor Henkin is absolutely correct. However,
what he refers to as the "lacunae" of the constitutional blueprint
lead him to speculate that the Framers had a limited conception of
foreign affairs. I submit that they did not. They fully understood the
complexity of foreign affairs, and they fully intended to create a
constitutional framework for the conduct of foreign relations.
One of the most frequently reiterated cliches about foreign affairs,
not embraced by Professor Henkin, to be sure, is that our foreign
relations are infinitely more complex now than they were at the time
of the nation's founding. I wonder. At the time of the Constitutional
*Professor of Law and Political Science, University of Chicago; Referendar, 1961, Ham-
burg; LL.M., 1962, Yale University; Dr. iur. utr., 1964, Freiburg.
' L. HENmiN, FOREIGN AFFAERs AND THE CONSTrrUTION 45-50 (1972).
2 See, e.g., Justice Sutherland's oft-cited opinion in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Ex-
port Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319-21 (1936) (dictum), citing out of context 6 ANNALs OF CONG. 613
(1800) (statement by John Marshall). For two contrasting views on this question, compare
McDougal & Lans, Treaties and Congressional-Executive or Presidential Agreements: Inter-
changeable Instruments of National Policy (pts. 1-2), 54 YALE L.J. 181, 534 (1945), with
Berger, The Presidential Monopoly of Foreign Relations, 71 MICH. L. REv. 1 (1972).
3 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
'Id.
5Id.
r7,7,7
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Convention, Europe presented America with incredibly intricate
foreign policy problems. The Europe of that period was a tangled
skein of shifting alliances, dynastic ambitions, incipient revolution,
and trade rivalries. In dealing with these problems under the Arti-
cles of Confederation, the Framers undoubtedly came to appreciate
the complexity of foreign affairs in a troubled world.' Professor Hen-
kin says that he was surprised to find little in the Constitution on
the conduct of foreign relations. I would argue that, well aware of
the complexities of foreign affairs, the Framers consciously designed
the Constitution to deal primarily with matters of foreign relations,
defense policy, and foreign commercial affairs.7 Significantly, they
chose to grant Congress the dominant role in foreign affairs. They
gave it the decisive voice in providing for the national defense and
regulating foreign commerce.' They subjected treaties to the veto of
one-third plus one of the Senators To guarantee that Presidents
would not make secret deals with foreign powers, they even provided
for impeachment, the ultimate deterrent."0
This clear purpose of the Framers to secure a controlled foreign
policy offers a valuable perspective on the questions before the Com-
mission. I would argue that we should take these original constitu-
tional arrangements seriously. Professor Rostow would reply that
the Constitution is better understood not as a document with an
unchanging meaning but as an evolving body of law. However, I
think there has been a rather large amount of epistemological one-
sidedness in the discussion of this question. While it would be un-
sound to ignore the historical fact that the Constitution has been
adapted by Supreme Court interpretation and governmental prac-
tice to meet changing needs, unconstitutional practices cannot be-
come legitimate simply by the mere lapse of time. There is no way
around the question whether a certain practice is in accord with the
basic scheme and purposes of the Framers. Chief Justice Marshall's
I For a chronicle of the American diplomatic efforts from the Declaration of Independence
to the ratification of the Constitution, see S. BEmiS, A DiLOiATIC HISTORY OF THE UNrrED
STATES 15-84 (1936).
7 See THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 303 (Mod. Lib. ed. 1941) (J. Madison): "The powers
delegated by the proposed Constitution are few and defined . . . [and] will be exercised
principally on external objects, as war, peace, negotiation, and foreign commerce."
'U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
Id. art. II, § 2.
,0 Id. art. I, § 3. See II M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 at
66 (1911) (comments of J. Madison).
[Vol. 61:747
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dictum that it is a constitution we have to expound"1 does not offer
even the beginnings of an answer.
In this regard, Professor Henkin notes that "the character and
needs of foreign relations" have shaped the detail of our foreign
affairs system, not the constitutional blueprint. I should be more
comfortable had he referred to the presumed needs of foreign rela-
tions. There have been a great number of unexamined assertions
about the modern character of foreign policy, some of which have a
hollow ring today. One of the most common of these is the hypothe-
sis that only the Executive Branch has the expertise to formulate
and implement foreign policy. Senator Church once remarked that
Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson were all
reared to this conviction.'2 Recent history has cast considerable
doubts upon this hypothesis.'3 In any event, it has the character of
a self-fulfilling prophecy. With the acquiescence of a Congress until
recently shying away from its constitutional responsibilities, the
President has concluded secret executive agreements, invoked exec-
utive privilege to deny access to foreign relations information, and
then in turn argued that Congress lacks a proper understanding of
foreign affairs. This circular pattern is as unbearable as the remedy
is easy. Congress must resist the use of unauthorized executive
agreements and the blanket invocation of executive privilege.
I agree with Professor Henkin that the President has the power
under the Constitution to make executive agreements on purely
"executive" matters. However, the circumvention of the Senate's
treaty-making role by means of broadly-scoped executive agree-
ments remains unconstitutional in spite of the volume and fre-
quency of such agreements. Professor Henkin argues that the Presi-
dent has the constitutional power to declare policy, make informal
commitments and understandings, and reflect general attitudes, all
in the daily conduct of foreign relations. It would be foolhardy to
quarrel with this assertion if by "informal" he means subject to
congressional disallowance through the exercise of the appropria-
tional and regulatory powers. But Professor Henkin apparently be-
lieves, though he expresses the belief very cautiously, that Congress
" McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819).
12 See Frankel, The Lessons of Vietnam, in THE PENTAGON PAPERS AS PUBLISHED BY THE NEW
YORK TimESs at 642 (Quadrangle Books ed. 1971).
" See generally R. DAHL, CONGRESS AND FOREIGN POLICY (1950); J. ROBINSON, CONGRESS AND
FOREIGN POLICY MAKING: A STUDY IN LEGISLATIVE INFLUENCE AND INITIATIVE (1962).
1975]
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would not be constitutionally justified "in refusing to support poli-
cies which are within the President's power to make." I respectfully
disagree with this implication that the Congress, as a matter of
constitutional, as distinguished from international, law, is bound to
deliver on the President's undertakings. Given the Framers' grant
to Congress of the power over war, commerce, and spending, the
President has little authority unilaterally to bind the nation to any-
thing. While this disability is perhaps inefficient in the narrow sense
that it makes hard and fast international commitments by Presi-
dents very difficult, it is written into the constitutional scheme. And
it is actually efficient in the broader sense that freely given congres-
sional consent will generally be more durable in the long run than
consent coerced through some theory of constitutional obligation.
In order to carry out its historically important constitutional res-
ponsibilities in foreign affairs, Congress must also resist presidential
attempts to invoke executive privilege at will. I would argue that
such resistance to executive privilege has a textual constitutional
sanction. Congress has the plenary power to make laws necessary
and proper "for carrying into Execution" the powers vested by the
Constitution in any officer of the government." In doing so, Con-
gress can even regulate, though not eliminate, presidential powers."
It follows that Congress has the power to regulate concerning confi-
dentiality in government generally, including executive privilege."0
There may be a core of executive privilege which Congress cannot
constitutionally impair. Although the concept is never mentioned in
the Constitution, the Supreme Court has recently said in United
States v. Nixon 7 that "the protection of the confidentiality of presi-
dential communications has . . . constitutional underpinnings" in
the nature of the executive power. 8 The Court took a balancing
approach to the question whether a particular exercise of executive
privilege is constitutionally protected, comparing the importance of
the particular value that would be frustrated by such exercise. 9 It
"U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
"See generally E. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS (4th ed. 1957).
While Professor Henkin suggests that the case for executive privilege is strongest in the
White House and weakest as one descends further into the bureaucracy, I do not consider
this standard very helpful. The legitimacy of executive privilege lies not primarily in mere
proximity to the President but rather with the nation's interest in confidentiality.
418 U.S. 683 (1974).
,Id. at 705-06.
" See id. at 707-14.
[Vol. 61:747
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seems to me that a responsible Congress, too, must in the first
instance balance the various interests at stake. In each case, it must
weigh its own need for information to fulfill its constitutional obliga-
tions against the needs for secrecy in national security affairs0 and
confidentiality of presidential communications. Where the congres-
sional and judicial balance will be struck will depend in part on the
manner in which Congress safeguards the confidentiality of infor-
mation it receives. But Congress should be able to prevent the more
arbitrary assertions of executive privilege that characterize the pres-
ent foreign affairs system.
Thus, simply by repudiating the use of broad executive agree-
ments and demanding the information it needs, Congress can begin
to perform its constitutional role in the conduct of foreign relations.
I am, therefore, in complete agreement with Professor Henkin's re-
luctance to engage in constitutional surgery.2 Constitutional
amendments are simply unnecessary if Congress takes these and
other initiatives.
In spite of Professor Rostow's criticism of what he refers to as
constitutional fundamentalism, I would reaffirm the basic system
established in 1787. In only one minor respect, I think, should we
consider a system change. The need for this has been caused not so
much by changing times as by our own constitutional amendment
in another area. In giving the Senate a special role in confirming
treaties without House approval, the Framers' view was that Sena-
tors would be elder statesmen performing an advisory service to the
President. Since 1913, however, the Senators, like the members of
the House, have been popularly elected. Given this constitutional
21 There is dictum in Nixon that suggests greater weight to claims of executive privilege
where its exercise would protect this need for secrecy in matters of national security. Id. at
706-07.
22 I do, however, take issue with Professor Henkin's remarks that changing to a parliamen-
tary system would not give the Congress more information and authority in the realm of
foreign affairs. I would submit that the prime minister in a parliamentary government,
despite his majority status, is subject to informal restraints requiring him to consult with
parliamentary colleagues for their viewpoints. The foreign policy initiatives of the coalition
government in Germany of Social Democrats and Free Democrats, for example, could not
have succeeded without intensive prior consultations with the party leadership-which is for
the most part identical with the parliamentary leadership. And in the case of such a major
policy approach as Ostpolitik, the Brandt government sought support from the opposition as
well. Thus the parliamentary system would certainly help to achieve informally what Profes-
sor Ehrlich has suggested the War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973),
has done more formally-force the executive to consult with the Congress at early stages of
the foreign policy formulation process.
1975]
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change, and also the important legal consequences of treaties, Con-
gress might consider a constitutional amendment allowing House
participation in the treaty ratification process.22 Nevertheless, with
this one minor exception, Congress should not tamper constitution-
ally with the foreign affairs framework originally established by the
Framers.
In conclusion, let me suggest what Professor Henkin would refer
to as a sub-constitutional improvement in our present system for
conducting foreign policy. As I have noted, part of Congress' consti-
tutional responsibility to formulate foreign policy arises from its
power to authorize programs and appropriate funds for the conduct
of foreign relations. Today, however, the appropriations process is
generally characterized by "incrementalism." Congress examines
executive budget requests each fiscal year with a presumption that
the appropriations for the preceding year are still justified; the Ex-
ecutive Branch need only justify requests for additional funds.23
Unfortunately, Congress takes this annual, incremental approach
not only when appropriating funds but also when originally author-
izing programs. 4 Especially when employed at this authorization
stage, the incremental approach deprives the Congress of any seri-
ous voice in the foreign policy process (as well as the domestic one).
Switching from an annual to a long-term system of authorizations
would remedy this congressional inadequacy. The substantive con-
22 Arguably Congress has authority to continue the present system of congressionally
approved executive agreements with the scope and force of treaties.
1 See generally A. WILDAVSKY, THE POLITICS OF THE BUDGETARY PROCESS (1964); Lindblom,
The Science of "Muddling Through," 19 PuB. AD. REV. 79 (1959). For a standard criticism of
incrementalism, see C. SCHULTZE, THE PoLrrcs AND ECONOMICS OF PUBuc SPENDING (1968).
24 See Hearings on the Federal Fiscal Year as It Relates to the Congressional Budget
Process Before the Joint Comm. on Congressional Operations, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. 129
(1971) (testimony of former Budget Director Charles L. Schultze):
My first recommendation would be to eliminate the practice of annual authoriza-
tions. At the present time such major areas as defense procurement, construction, and
R. & D., space, atomic energy, National Science Foundation, OEO, and the Coast
Guard are subject to annual authorizations. . . . It seems to me that authorization
committees should be engaged in basic evaluation and review of Federal programs.
Each program literally cannot be carefully reviewed from the ground up each year.
Rather, a cycle of evaluation and review could be undertaken with perhaps 3-year
authorizations, and with a part of an agency or a major program area receiving atten-
tion each year. Thus in every 3-year cycle an authorizing committee would have com-
pleted a review of the programs under its jurisdiction - . . . Such a practice would
achieve, I believe, the desirable goal of focusing attention on long-term trends and
results.
But see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
[Vol. 61:747
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gressional committees could use such authorization hearings as an
occasion for the comprehensive review of governmental policies.25
Congress should conduct this comprehensive review without regard
to the present artificial distinction between foreign and defense pol-
icy. It might even be advisable to combine the expertise of the
foreign affairs and defense committees for reviewing long-term au-
thorizations by establishing joint subcommittees along lines which
make a multi-faceted policy review possible.21
I realize, of course, that even these modest proposals threaten
powerful and established congressional and executive interests. But,
to fulfill its mandate to create a more effective system for the con-
duct of foreign relations, the Commission must be willing to chal-
lenge these interests.
21 My approach here is in sharp contrast to that of Professors Henkin and Falk, who argue
instead that Congress should review foreign policies through Senate confirmation hearings.
The Senate, to be sure, does possess the constitutional ability to review foreign policy in such
a setting, since it can withhold confirmation of an official for any reason whatsoever. Still,
review in the context of nomination hearings would be exceedingly unwise. The confirmation
question primarily involves issues of individual personality and qualifications totally unre-
lated to issues of long-term foreign policy. Linking policy considerations to an individual's
fitness for a particular post could hamper Senate attempts to formulate foreign policy objec-
tively.
21 Many of these budgetary recommendations may be realized in the wake of the recently
enacted Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344,
88 Stat. 297, codified at 31 U.S.C.A. §§ 1301 et seq. (Supp. 1975). The Act announces it tobe the duty of the new Budget Committees to study proposals for "establishing maximum
and minimum time limitations for program authorization." 31 U.S.C.A. § 1301(a)(3). See also
id. § 1322(d) (requiring multi-year planning considerations from the Budget Committee
reports that will accompany the new first concurrent resolutions on the budget); id. § 1352(f)(requiring the Appropriations Committees to study all current laws "which provide spending
authority or permanent budget authority"); id. § 1353 (requiring multi-year planning consid-
erations from the Director of the new Congressional Budget Office for every public bill re-
ported out of substantive committee).
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